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LOCAL NUMBER 93, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
FIREFIGHTERS v. CITY OF CLEVELAND: A CONSENT
DECREE IS NOT AN ADJUDICATED ORDER FOR
PURPOSES OF TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 which has been applied to
municipalities,2 was enacted by Congress to deal with discrimination in
employment.3 The United States Supreme Cour has interpreted the primary
purpose of Title VII as legislation to "achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an iden-
tifiable group of white employees over other employees."5 Congress 6 and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission7 preferred voluntary compliance
to achieve Title VII's objectives.
The Supreme Court has held that this voluntary action by the parties may
include some type of race-conscious relief.' The Court has recently held that
Section 706(g)9 of Title VII permits a court to order, in certain limited cir-
142 U.S.C. § 2000e (1978). For an in depth discussion of Title VII, see C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R.
RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1980) [hereinafter referred to as
Sullivan). See also Symposium 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. IN-
DUS. COM. L. REV. 413 (1986); Gould, Employment Security Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967).
'Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
342 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a) (1978).
'Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court, in Abemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 419 (1975), stated that a second purpose is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination."
'Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
'See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Congress created the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state and local equal employment
opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes through con-
ference, conciliation and persuasion... (c)ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the pre-
ferred means for achieving this goal").
'According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, "(v)oluntary affirmative action to improve
opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and protected in order to carry out the congres-
sional intent embodied in Title VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1985). For a discussion of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity acts, see Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964 and 1972: A Critical
Analysis, 2 IND. REL. L.J. 1 (1977); Rodriguez, A Look at Equal Employment Opportunity, 33 LABOR L.J.
259 (1982).
'United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (Title VII's prohibition in §§ 703 (a)
and (d) against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plans).
'Section 706(g) of Title VII provides that: If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in
or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may en-
join the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may
be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems ap-
propriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge
with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or per-
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cumstances, 0 affirmative race-conscious relief to unidentified victims as a
remedy for past discrimination." The problem that occurs is whether a court
related remedy constitutes an "order" under Section 706(g) or a voluntary ac-
tion by the parties. The distinction is important because voluntary actions
seem to be subjected to less judicial scrutiny. This problem is compounded
when the parties enter into a voluntary agreement and the court's approval of
the agreement takes on the characteristics of an order. This is the very situa-
tion that occurreed in Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City
of Cleveland. 12 Here an affirmative action plan between the parties was incor-
porated into a consent decree. 3
This note will examine the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, and
explore its potential implications in future Title VII actions. The issue the
Supreme Court had to decide was whether a consent decree is a form of court
ordered relief for purposes of Title VII litigation. The Supreme Court' held
that whether or not Title VII precludes a court from imposing certain forms of
race-conscious relief for non-victims after a trial, it does not preclude relief
awarded in a consent decree. 5 The Court's analysis included discussions on:
(1) whether consent decrees are among the "orders" referred to in Section
706(g) of Title VII;16
(2) whether a federal court is barred from entering a consent decree mere-
ly because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have
awarded after a trial; 7 and
(3) whether the fact that the consent decree was entered into without the
sons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court
shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstate-
ment, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such in-
dividual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin or in violation of section 704 (a) 142 USCS § 2000e-3(a)].
"Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3036 (1986) ("(w)here an
employer or union has engaged in particularly longstanding or egregious discrimination, an injunction sim-
ply reiterating Title VII's prohibition against discrimination will often prove useless and will only result in
endless enforcement litigation.").
"Id. at 3036-37.
2Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
3A consent decree is "an order of the court approving and embodying an agreement of litigation; the party's
negotiated resolution of the dispute attains the status of judicial relief by virtue of the court's having ap-
proved the settlement and having ordered it to be enforced." Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of
Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1983). For a critical
discussion of the uses of a consent decree, see Comment, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Com-
promise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1314 (1959).
"4Brennan, J., delivered the opinion for the majority, in which Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and
O'Connor, JJ, joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which
Burger, C.J., joined.
"Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3080.
"1Id. at 3074-76.
"Id. at 3077-79. 2
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petitioner's consent affected its validity. 8
THE FACTS
On October 23, 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland (Vanguards) 9 filed a
class action against the City of Cleveland (City)2" alleging discrimination on the
basis of race and national origin." The complaint stated that this discrimina-
tion occurred due to intentional practices by the City.22 The suit was filed on
behalf of all present and future minorities. 3 This was not the first lawsuit in
which the City was charged with discrimination,"4 and the City was very will-
ing to try and reach some type of settlement. 5
On April 27, 1981, Local Number 93 of the International Association of
Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C. (Local)26 filed a motion27 with the court to in-
tervene as a party-plaintiff. The motion was granted and the Local filed a
"complaint"28 with the district court. The Vanguards and the City continued to
negotiate, and filed a proposed consent decree with the district court29 in
8Id. at 3079-80.
"The Vanguards of Cleveland are an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters employed by the City
of Cleveland.
"The class action was brought under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 3066.
"The complaint alleged discrimination "in the hiring, assignment and promotion of firefighters within the
City of Cleveland Fire Department." Id.
"According to the Vanguards, these intentional practices included:
(1) written examination that were allegedly discriminatory;
(2) reinforcement of the effects of this test by the use of seniority points and the manipulation of
retirement dates; and
(3) the City limiting minority advancement by deliberately.refusing to administer a new promotional
exam after 1975.
Id. at 3067.
"Id. at 3066.
2 See Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (district court enjoining certain
hiring practices and establishing minority hiring goals for police department); and Headen v. City of Cleve-
land, No. C73-330 (N.D. Ohio, unreported, April 25, 1975) (court imposing hiring quotas on fire depart-
ment).
"As counsel for the City stated at oral argument:
"You don't have to beat us on the head. We finally learned what we have to do and what we have to
try to do to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the City to comply with the law fully."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-2.
"Local 93 actually represents the majority of firefighters in the City of Cleveland.
"The motion was made pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24(a)(2). Local 93, Int7Ass'n of
Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3067.
"Despite the document's title, the Supreme Court stated that the document "did not allege any causes of ac-
tion or assert any claims against either the Vanguards or the City." Id. at 3067-68. The document also stated
that "(p)romotions based upon any criterion other than competence, such as a racial quota system, would
deny those most capable from their promotions and would deny the residents of the City of Cleveland from
maintaining the best possible fire fighting force." Id. at 3068.
"This proposed consent decree established a two-step procedure to remedy the City's past discriminatory
policies. The first step provided that a fixed number of promotions (16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieuten-
ant, 3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promotions to Battalion Chief, and I of 3 planned
promotions to Assistant Chief) were to be made to minority firefighters. The second step involved the
Winter, !19871
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November, 1981.
The Local objected to this proposed consent decree," and the district
court held hearings on January 7 and 8, 1982, to consider those objections.
The district court ruled that any discussions between the Vanguards and the
City would have to include the Local 1 and deferred approval of the consent de-
cree. The district court also stated that the Local would have to make its objec-
tions to the proposed consent decree specific .3 At the second hearing, held on
April 27, 1982, there was still no agreement between the parties, and the dis-
trict court referred the matter to a United States magistrate.3 3 The three parties
negotiated under the magistrate's supervision 3 and came to a tentative agree-
ment, subject to approval by the membership of the Local.3 This proposed
agreement was overwhelmingly rejected by the membership of the Local1 6
On January 11, 1983, the Vanguards and the City filed a second proposed
consent decree" with the district court and moved for its approval.38 The Local
filed another objection, but this time the district court approved the consent
decree.39
The Local appealed the entering of the consent decree to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals." After the Sixth Circuit had heard the oral arguments in the
instant case, the Supreme Court decided Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
establishment of promotion goals for minorities. This plan was to remain in effect for a maximum of fifteen
years. Appellate Record at 32-4, 36.
3OThe Local objected to the use of minority hiring requirement, the possible life of the plan, and the Local's
exclusion from the negotiations between the City and the Vanguards. Local 93, Int'lAss'n of Firefighters,
106 S. Ct. at 3068.
""I am going to at this time defer this proceeding until another day, and I am mandating the City and the
Vanguards to engage the Firefighters in discussions." Transcript of first hearing at 151.
32"I don't think the Firefighters are going to win their position on the basis that well, Judge, you know,
there's something inherently wrong about quotas. You know, it's not fair. We need more than that." Id. at
153.
"Local 93, Int7 Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3068.
14Counsel for all three parties participated in forty hours of intensive negotiations. Id. at 3069.
"The revised consent decree actually increased the number of supervisory positions available to nonminori-
ty firefighters. Id.
"The vote was 660 to 89. Id.
"This decree split the promotions between nonminorities and qualified minorities and restored the use of
seniority points as a factor in ranking candidates for promotion. The life of the decree was also reduced to
four years. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 29-38.
3SThis proposal was based on the agreement worked out between all three parties under the magistrate's
supervision. Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3069.
"The district court held that "(t)he documents, statistics, and testimony presented at the January and April
1982 hearings reveal a historical pattern of racial discrimination in the promotions in the City of Cleveland
Fire Department." Appendix to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland at 43-4. The court also held that the
second proposed consent decree was a "fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the claims raised in the
action." Id. at A5.
4°Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985), affd, Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
[Vol. 20:3
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Stotts,41 which also dealt with consent decrees, affirmative relief, and Title
VII.42 The Sixth Circuit, concerned with the potential impact of Stotts, ordered
the parties to submit supplemental briefs. 3 The Sixth Circuit then determined
that the decision in Stotts did not affect the outcome of the instant case," and
affirmed the district court's decision. 5
The Local then petitioned6 the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.47
They argued that a "consent decree entered in Title VII litigation is invalid if it
utilizes racial preferences that may benefit individuals who are not themselves
actual victims of an employer's discrimination. 4 s The Supreme Court granted
the petition,' 9 and affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit.5 0 The Supreme
Court held that "whether or not § 706(g) precludes a court from imposing cer-
tain forms of race-conscious relief after trial, that provision does not apply to
'41Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
4 1n Stotts, the parties had already entered into a consent decree in a Title VII action against a city. When
the city began to layoff minorities, in accordance with the city's "last hired - first fired" policy, the district
court modified the decree and enjoined the city from laying off the minorities. The Sixth Circuit affirmed
this decision, but the Supreme Court reversed it. The Supreme Court held that "the Court of Appeals im-
posed on the parties as an adjunct of settlement something that could not have been ordered had the case
gone to trial and the plaintiffs proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination existed." Id. at 2588. The
Court reasoned that § 706(g) of Title VII prohibits a court from ordering an employer to replace a non-
minority with a minority. Id. at 2590.
4
1 Vanguards of Cleveland, 753 F.2d at 486.
""The fact that this case involves a consent decree and not an injunction makes the legal basis of the Stotts
decision inapplicable." Id.
"The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the district court's decision, concluded by stating that "(s)ince nothing in Ti-
tle VII, as interpreted in Stotts, forbids this consent decree and since, as we have already determined, the
decree is proper under the standards recognized in cases such as Bratton, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED." 1d. at 489. In Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 887 (6th Cir.), modified on rehearing,
712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984), the court defined the applicable standards
for affirmative relief given by municipalities by stating that the consent decree must be fair, adequate, and
reasonable. The court then stated that:
(o)nce the governmental interest in some remedial action is thus established, we must proceed to
determine whether the remedial measures are reasonable. This includes an examination of whether
any discrete group or individual is stigmatized by the program and whether racial classifications have
been reasonably used in light of the program's objectives. If the affirmative action plan satisfies these
criteria, it does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 887.
For further discussions of these criteria, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518-19 (1980); Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 694 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
'"The Local was supported in its case by the United States, who filed as amicus curae, Local 93, Int'lAss'n of
Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3071, and supported all of the Local's contentions.
41The petition actually raised two questions:
(1) May a District Court adopt provisions in a consent decree purporting to remedy a Title VII viola-
tion that it would have had no authority to order as a remedy if the matter had gone to trial?
(2) May a municipal employer voluntarily adopt an affirmative action promotional scheme over the
objections of an intervenor union duly elected to represent all employees when said promotional
scheme adversely affects the rights and interests of the employees and awards relief to minority
employees regardless of whether they were actual victims of past racial discrimination?
Id. at 3071 n. 5. The Court felt it was only necessary to decide the first question, because the district court
had retained jurisdiction for all other claims the Local might have had before that court. Id. See, Appendix
to Petition for Certiorari, A38 (court retained jurisdiction for "all purposes of enforcement, modification, or
amendment of the Decree upon application of any party").
41Id. at 3071.
"Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985).
"Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3071.
Winter, 19871 RECENT CASES
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relief awarded in a consent decree." 5'
ANALYSIS
Justice Brennan's Majority Opinion.
At the outset of the majority opinion, 52 the Court stated that it has often
recognized that "Congress did intend for voluntary compliance to be the
preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII," 3 and that "voluntary
action available to employers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimina-
tion may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits individuals who
were not actual victims of discrimination. 54 The Court then held that there
was no reason to distinguish between voluntary actions supported by consent
decrees and voluntary actions without consent decrees.55
The Court did not decide whether the City's actions would be acceptable
under Section 70356 of Title VII, or if state action was present." The Court
stated that the only issue before it was "whether, assuming arguendo that §
706(g) would bar a court from ordering such race conscious relief after trial in
some of these instances, § 706(g) also bars a court from approving a consent
decree entered into by the employers and providing for such relief. 5
5lid.
51See supra note 14.
"Id. For an in depth analysis of voluntary actions being the preferred means of achieving Title VII's objec-
tives, see, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc.
479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)) (Title VII sanctions cause employers "'to self-examine and self evaluation
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfor-
tunate and ignominious page in this country's history"). See also Ford Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219,
228 (1982); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Intl Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1983).
4Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3072.
"Id. at 3073. The court cited Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) in support of its position.
In Carson, the Supreme Court stated that a court's order denying entry of a consent decree is immediately
appealable because the court's actions nullified Congress' strong preferences for encouraging voluntary set-
tlement of employment discrimination claims. Id. at 88 n. 14.
"Section 703 of Title VII provides that:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
For an analysis of Section 703 of Title VII, see Note, Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971).
"The fourteenth amendment provides that: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. For discussions on the relationship between
municipalities, the Fourteenth Amendment, and discrimination, see Note, The Due Process Rights ofPublic
Employees, 50 NYU L. REV. 310 (1975); Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 70 N.W.U.L. REV. 770 (1975).
"Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3073 N. 8.
[Vol. 20:3
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The Local's main argument was that § 706(g)59 established an independent
limitation on what types of relief a court could order.60 The Local argued that a
consent decree should be considered an order because:
(1) a consent decree looks like and is entered as a judgment;6
(2) the court retains the power to modify a consent decree in certain cir-
cumstances62 over the objection of the signatory; and
(3) noncompliance with a consent decree is enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings. 3
The Court noted that consent decrees have attributes of both voluntary agree-
ments and judicial decrees. ' The court rejected the argument 5 that legislative
history"' intended to include consent decrees as "orders" within the meaning of
§ 706(g).17 The court also reasoned that the voluntary nature 8 of consent
"See supra note 9.
'Id. at 3073.
"Anderson, supra note 13 at 585 and note 18. "A consent decree is a judicial act and should be treated as
such because 'judgment' as used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure includes a decree."
"See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) ("A continuing decree of injunction directed to
events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need").
"United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440 and n. 8 (5th Cir. 1981) (The consent decree "may be en-
forced by judicial sanctions, including citation for contempt if it is violated.").
"Local 93, IntlAss'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. 3074. See, United States v. ITT" Continental Baking Co., 420
U.S. 223, 236-37, and n. 10 (1975) ("While they (consent decrees) are arrived at by negotiation between the
parties and often admit no violation of law, they are motivated by threatened or pending litigation and must
be approved by the court').
OLocal 93, Int'lAss'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3076. The Court, in rejecting the Local's argument, stated
that:
(1) the fact that a consent decree looks like a judgment entered after a trial obviously does not impli-
cate Congress' concern with limiting the federal courts unilaterally to require employers or unions
to make certain kinds of employment decisions;
(2) the mere existence of an unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a consent
decree does not alter the fact that those obligations were created by agreement of the parties;
(3) there is no indication in the legislative history that the availability of judicial enforcement of an
obligation, rather than the creation of the obligation itself, was the focus of congressional con-
cern.
"Id. at 3075. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong. I st Sess., pt. 1, p. 11, 110 CONG. REC. 1518, 2567-71, 6549
(1964). That Court reasoned that since Section 706 of Title VII does not discuss limits to voluntary actions,
only what a court cannot order, those voluntary actions may award affirmative race-conscious relief.
"United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Weber the Supreme Court stated that
the "natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action."
Id. at 206. This case involved a white employee bringing an action against his employer and his union
challenging the legality of a voluntary plan for on-the-job training providing for a one to one quota for
minority workers. The Supreme Court held that this voluntary race-conscious affirmative action taken by
the employer and the union did not violate "Title VII's prohibition in §§ 703(a) and (d) against racial
discrimination." Id. at 208. For a discussion of the effect of Weber on voluntary action taken by an
employer, see Allegretti, Voluntary Racial Goals after Weber, How High is Too High? 17 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 773 (1983-84).
"See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971) ("The parties waive their right to litigate the
issues involved in the case," and "the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise"); Ashley v. City
of Jackson, 104 S. Ct. 255, 257 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (A consent decree
is "little more than a contract between the parties, formalized by the signature of a judge'). See also Com-
ment, supra note 13, at 1317.
RECENT CASESWinter, 19871
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decrees was sufficient to conclude that "it is readily apparent that consent
decrees are not included among the 'orders' referred to in § 706(g)."69
Inherent in the Court's decision was the tension between voluntary and
court ordered affirmative relief. The emphasis in Title VII litigation is on
voluntary settlements and courts seem to encourage voluntary settlements
without court interference. On the other hand, the consent decree is deliberate-
ly fashioned, and not just deduced from a legal harm suffered. 0 Without the
voluntary agreement of the parties there could be no consent decree, but the
enforcement nature of the decree prolongs the court's involvement, with the
dispute.7' There is a tension between the hands-off approach of voluntary set-
tlements and the limitations of court-ordered relief. Courts do not want to
"order" relief. The instant case allows a court, by using a consent decree, to
avoid those limitations. Early Supreme Court cases considered a consent
decree to be a court ordered judicial act.7" The Supreme Court in the instant
case, however, has held that a consent decree is a voluntary contractual-type
undertaking by the parties.73
As a second argument, the Local cited Stotts74 and System Federation No.
91, Railway Employees' Department v. Wright. 75 In both of these cases, the
Supreme Court held that a consent decree could not provide greater relief than
a court could have awarded after a trial.76 The Court distinguished these two
cases from the instant case by concluding that in both cases the Court had
found "conflicts between a judicial decree and the underlying statute. ' 77 The
Court reiterated its statement that race-conscious consent decree relief did not
violate the objectives of § 706(g). The court further held that because the par-
"Local 93, International Association of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3075.
70Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298 (1976).
71Id.
"See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 115 (the Court rejected an argument by an intervening
party that "a decree entered upon consent is to be treated as a contract and not as a judicial act").
"For discussions as to whether a consent decree is a contract or a judicial act, see, United States v. ITT Con-
tinental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 236-37 n. 10; Anderson, supra note 13, at 584-86.
"Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2576. For a discussion of Stotts, see notes 41 and 42. Stotts also relied on two other
cases regarding consent decrees and Title VII: Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and Franks
v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Both of these cases concerned the remedial powers of a
court in a coercive action and did not consider the effect of voluntary action by the parties.
"System Fed'n No. 91, Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961). Wright involved a union moving
to modify a 1945 consent decree which had enjoined a railroad and a union from discriminating against non-
union employees. The union wanted to modify the consent decree to permit, under certain circumstances, a
contract requiring a union shop. The district court refused to modify the consent decree, and the Supreme
Court held that this refusal was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 652. The Supreme Court stated that "a sound
judicial discretion may call for the modification of terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances,
whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen." Id.
at 647.
7"Local 93, Int7 Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3077.
"Id. at 3078. The statute in conflict in Stotts was Title VII, and the statute in conflict in Wright was the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq.
[Vol. 20:3
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ties' consent is the animating force,7 "a federal court is not necessarily barred
from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader
relief than the court could have awarded after a trial. 79
The Court reemphasized that the agreement by the parties can be subject
to attack.Y' The Court stated that the "fact that the parties have consented to
the relief contained in a decree does not render their action immune from at-
tack on the grounds that it violates § 703 of Title VII or the Fourteenth
Amendment."'"
The Court summarized its rejection of the Local's second argument by
stating:
[blecause § 706(g) is not concerned with voluntary agreements by employ-
ers or unions to provide race-conscious relief, there is no inconsistency
between it and a consent decree providing such relief, although the court
might be barred from ordering the same relief after a trial or, as in Stotts,
in disputed proceedings to modify a decree entered upon consent.8 2
With this part of the opinion, the Court appears to be limiting its opinion
only to situations where there are no conflicts between the consent decree and
some related statute. The Court's holding establishes a rule that a court may
enter a consent decree that provides greater relief than that court could have
otherwise awarded if the parties voluntarily agree, and if there is no conflict
between that consent decree and an underlying statute. 3 This holding might
put a court in the awkward position of examining a consent decree for conflicts
with an underlying statute, and perhaps modifying that consent decree, even
though the decree has already been voluntarily agreed to by the parties.
A court would have the power to change the decree to gain some result,
even though it would not have that power to award that same remedy at trial. 4
This part of the Court's decision provides a great impetus for courts to urge op-
posing parties to voluntarily agree to some type of relief, because parties would
have less restrictions as to what type of relief could be awarded in the decree.
The third and final argument of the Local was that the consent decree
was invalid because it was entered into without the consent of the Local. 5 The
Local claimed that because it was permitted to intervene as of right, the district
"Id. at 3077.
791d.
801d.
"Id. at 3077-78.
2Id. at 3079.
831d.
-42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(g) (Section 706 of Title VII) expressly limits what a court can order for relief after a
trial. See, supra, note 9.
"Local 93, IntYAss'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3079.
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court had to receive the Local's permission before approving the consent
decree. 6
The Court also rejected this argument. The Court stated that "(i)t has
never been supposed that one party - whether an original party, a party that
was joined later, or an intervenor - could preclude other parties from settling
their own disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation."87 The Court then
stated that while an intervening party may present evidence at a hearing on
whether to approve a consent decree, "it does not have the power to block the
decree merely by withholding its consent."" The Court was also quick to em-
phasize that any settlement between the City and the Vanguards by consent
decree did not affect the "legal duties and obligations of the Union [Local] at
all." 9
In this part of the opinion, the Court seems to ignore the very real
possibility that the affirmative relief awarded in the consent decree could affect
the Local. Minorities were guaranteed a certain number of high-ranking posi-
tions by the plan,9° and members of the Local would not be allowed to be pro-
moted into those positions. As Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
argue in their dissenting opinion, the consent decree would very much bind the
members of the Local in what they could do.91
The Court noted that if the intervening claims were properly raised, those
claims would remain and the intervening party could still litigate them.92 The
Local would still have its claims, however the Local, to overcome the limita-
tions contained in the consent decree have to convince the court to modify the
consent decree. If the district court refused, the Local would be very much
bound by the consent decree.
The Court also noted that the Local might have a valid claim under Sec-
"Id.
7Id.
"For further discussions as to the rights of an intervening party, see Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 455
U.S. 385, 392 (1982) ("(t)he right to have its objection heard does not, of course, give the intervenor the right
to block any settlement to which it objects"); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't, 711 F.2d 1117, 1126 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984) ("although non-minority third parties allowed to intervene in
cases which involve consent decrees or settlement agreements implementing race-conscious hiring or promo-
tional remedies do have a sufficient interest to argue that the decree or agreement is unreasonable or
unlawful, their interest in the expectation of appointment does not require their consent as a condition to
any compromise of the litigation").
"Local 93, Int Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3080. The Court also recognized that parties may not
enter into a consent decree "that imposes obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree." See 3B J.
MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.16(6) (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]
("the intervening parties may not stipulate away the rights of the intervener'); Ashley, 104 S. Ct. at 257.
'"The plan did guarantee that out of the sixty-six higher level promotions, one-half would go to minorities,
Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3069.
11Id. at 3083.
"See MOORE, supra note 89; Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 563 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir.
1977) ("Once intervention has been allowed, the original parties may not stipulate away the rights of the in-
tervener").
[Vol. 20:3
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tion 703 of Title VII or the Fourteenth Amendment,93 but concluded that the
only issue before the Court was whether Section 706(g) barred the district
court from approving the consent decree.94 The Court held that Section 706(g)
did not prevent the district court from entering the consent decree and af-
firmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit. 5
Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion.
Justice O'Connor joined in the Court's holding but wrote a separate opin-
ion to emphasize that the Court's holding was a narrow one.96 The Court held
that "the relief provided in a consent decree need not conform to the limits on
court-ordered relief imposed by § 706(g)." The Court further stated that "a
court should not approve a consent decree that on its face provides for racially
preferential treatment that would clearly violate § 703 or the Fourteenth
Amendment." 97 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the validity of race-conscious
relief would still have to be assessed for consistency with the provisions of §
703, and, in the case of a public employer, for consistency with the fourteenth
amendment. Therefore, the Local could still challenge the race-conscious relief
as violative of its members' rights.98 Also, Justice O'Connor reemphasized that
the Court had refrained from deciding "what showing an employer would be
required to make concerning prior discrimination on its part against minorities
in order to defeat a challenge by non-minority employees based on § 703."99
Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court left open the question of
whether the race conscious measures were permissible under § 703.110 With all
of these stated exclusions, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion makes it
clear that the only thing the Supreme Court did decide was that a consent
decree is not an order for purposes of Section 706(g) of Title VII.
Justice White's Dissenting Opinion.
Justice White based his dissenting opinion01' on the idea that Title VII for-
bids discriminatory employment practices. 02 He reasoned that the majority
"See notes 56 and 57.
"Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3080.
95Id.
9Id.
"Id.
"Id.
"'Id.
11Id. at 3081.
"'See SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 2 ("Liberal interpretation of Title VII prohibits employers from
perpetuating discriminatory attitudes toward certain groups in our society ... Discriminatory preference for
any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed"). See also Griggs, 401
U.S. at 431 ("What is required by Congress is the removal of arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissi-
ble classifications').
Winter, 1987] RECENT CASES
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opinion would permit a court to enter a consent decree that would require con-
duct of the very nature that Title VII seeks to prohibit."3
Justice White also alleged that the Court sought to avoid the issue of
whether the consent decree in the instant case already violated Title VII.14
Justice White then stated that because the consent decree in the instant case
called for racial preferences for minorities in the form of promotion quotas,'"5
the consent decree exceeded the limits of a permissible remedy.3 6 Because the
consent decree would "burden" nonminorities,17 and could benefit persons
who were not actual victims, Justice White concluded that the remedy provid-
ed for the consent decree was inequitable. Justice White believed that such a
remedy "could not have been ordered after a trial,"'' 0 and was not valid even if
it was agreed to by the City."9
In writing his dissenting opinion, Justice White seems to completely ig-
nore the Court's decision in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Interna-
tional Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,1" which
was decided on the same day as the instant case."' In Local 28, the Supreme
Court held that a court could award affirmative race-conscious relief as a
remedy for past discrimination even if there was a benefit to non-victims. The
consent decree in the instant case, even if it benefitted non-victims, did not, as
a matter of law, exceed any remedy available under Title VII.
Justice Rehnquist's Dissenting Opinion.
Justice Rehnquist"' began his dissenting opinion by stating that he fol-
"'Local 93, IntT Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3081. "Am employer may not, without violating Title
VII, simply decide for itself or in agreement with its employees to have a racially balanced workforce ... Ti-
tle VII would forbid quota hiring or promotion such as reserving every third promotion or vacancy for a
black, or a white for that matter."
1041Id.
10"The part of the consent decree that Justice White asserted was a racial preference for minorities consisted
of the promotion plan whereby one minority and one non-minority would be promoted each time, with no
regard for the ranking, seniority, or promotional exam results.
11Id. at 3082.
"'This burden that Justice White refers to would appear to be the possibility that a senior and better quali-
fied non-minority employee might not be promoted as fast as a less senior and less qualified minority
employee.
'"Id.
109i.
"Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'Int7lAss'n, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). In this case, the Court held that
Section 706(g) does not prohibit a court from ordering, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative race-
conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination. Id. at 3050. The Court first stated that affirmative relief
should not be used merely to create a racially balanced workforce and then stated that affirmative relief
should be used only in the most egregious situations. Id. Justice White appeared to be contending that the
City's conduct was not egregious enough, and that the consent decree was being used to create a racially
balanced workforce.
"'Both cases were decided on July 2, 1986.
"'Justice Rehnquist was joined in this dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Burger.
[Vol. 20:3
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RECENT CASES
lowed the holding in Stotts."' There the court held that minority beneficiaries
of a consent decree had to have been victims of previous discriminatory prac-
tices."4 Justice Rehnquist also maintained that the Court allowed the district
court's entry of the consent decree to stand, even though the only difference
between the instant case and Stotts was that Stotts involved the modification
of a consent decree.15
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion also failed to take into account the
decision of the Court in Local 28. 11 Stotts was decided before Local 28, "7 and
Stotts also involved a conflict with an underlying statute."' The Supreme
Court's decision in Local 28 makes Justice Rehnquist's first argument moot
because the Court held that race-conscious affirmative relief need not only
benefit past victims." 9
Justice Rehnquist then stated that the Court had to "implicitly repudiate
language in the two of our cases most closely in point - Stotts, and Railway
Employees v. Wright. 2' Justice Rehnquist is alluding to the fact that in both
cases the district court modified an existing consent decree. The Supreme
Court held that the district court's action was prohibited by § 706(g). The only
difference in the instant case is that the district court entered the consent
decree.' 2' This could be a major difference. The above cases involved the
modification of consent decrees that the parties had agreed on and the
modification imposed the court's will on the parties. A district court merely
entering a consent decree, agreed to by the parties, would impose nothing on
those parties.
What seemed to upset Justice Rehnquist was the fact that the consent
decree did not require the Local to do or not do anything.' Justice Rehnquist
stated that "the decree does bind the City of Cleveland to give preferential pro-
motions to minority firemen who have not been shown to be the victims of
discrimination in such a way that nonminority union members (the Local) who
would otherwise have received those promotions are obviously injured."'2
"'Stotts, 467 U.S. at 561.
"'Id at 578-79. See also Franks, 424 U.S. at 747; International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324.
"'Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3083.
"'Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'Int'l Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. at 3019.
"'Stotts was decided in 1984, and Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n was decided in 1986.
"'See note 77.
11id. at 3050.
"'Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3083.
'It should be noted, however, that there are many more differences between Stotts, Wright, and the instant
case than just the entry or modification of an existing consent decree. Stotts and Wright both involved con-
flicts with an underlying statute, and both were decided before Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'Int'l
Ass'n, which held that affirmative race-conscious relief could be awarded in a consent decree.
"'Id.
1231d
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Finally, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a consent decree was an ad-
judication"' under Section 706(g) by stating:
(S)ection 706(g) is the one section in the entire text of Title VII which
deals with the sort of relief which a court may order in a Title VII case; it
is simply incredible that the Court today virtually reads it out of existence.
Surely an order of the Court entered by the consent of the parties does not
become any less an order of the Court.2 '
CONCLUDING NOTES
A consent decree entered in a Title VII case may now provide for affir-
mative race-conscious relief, and that relief would not be prohibited by Section
706(g). This holding by the Supreme Court has several implications. A district
court now might possibly be put in the awkward position of enforcing some
type of race-conscious relief that the court would not have been permitted to
order following a trial.'26 A district court might also be more inclined to pro-
mote the idea of a consent decree, knowing that the consent decree can award
a greater range of relief.
The Court's decision in the instant case does not read Section 706(g) out
of existence. There are many possible types of orders a court can enter. The
Supreme Court merely held that a consent decree is not one of them, at least
for purposes of Title VII litigation. A consent decree is now considered a
voluntary act by the parties, and is not considered any form of court-ordered
relief.
The Supreme Court did not decide what would be considered acceptable
race-conscious relief under Section 703 of Title VII or the fourteenth amend-
ment."' 7 The decision authorizes the use of consent decrees but does not define
the possible limits of that decree. Until the Supreme Court decides the limits of
13'See lB MOORE, supra note 89 at 1 .409(5) (2d ed. 1984) (when a court "has rendered a consent judgment, it
has made an adjudication").
125Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3087.
"'As the Supreme Court noted in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'Int'l Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. at 3050, "a
court could consider whether affirmative action is necessary to remedy past discrimination in a particular
case before imposing such measures, "and" (i)n the majority of Title VII cases, the court will not have to im-
pose affirmative action as a remedy for past discrimination." While a court, in most cases, can not order af-
firmative relief, the holding of the court in the instant case makes it clear that affirmative relief can be
awarded by means of a consent decree. The Court even stated that "a Federal Court is not necessarily barred
from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provided broader relief that the court could have
awarded after a trial." Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. at 3077. See Sansom Committee v.
Lynn, 735 F.2d 1535, 1538 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984) ("as long as the terms of a consent
decree come 'within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings,' it will be within the district court's
power to enter the decree"); Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) cert denied 106 S. Ct. 3332
(1980) (citing Lynn) ('consent decrees need not be limited to the relief that a court could provide on the
merits').
'"Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. 3080.
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relief awarded in a consent decree 28 the crucial issue in any Title VII action
will remain undecided. As the Supreme Court stated in the instant case, "there
may be instances in which a public employer, consistent with both.the Four-
teenth Amendment as interpreted in Wygant'29 and § 703 as interpreted in
Weber, 130 could voluntarily agree to take race-conscious measures in pursuance
of a legitimate remedial purpose." '
PAUL LESLIE JACKSON
InTo gain some understanding of what standards a court would probably use to determine whether a con-
sent decree would be acceptable under Section 703 of Title VII and the fourteenth amendment, see
McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (Using section 703 of Title VII, courts
have "consistently interpreted Title VII to proscribe racial discrimination in private employment against
whites in the same terms as racial discrimination against non-whites"); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1848 (1986) ("public employers.., also must act in accordance with a 'core purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment' which is to do away with all governmentally imposed distinctions based on
race') (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
I"Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1842.
10Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-10. For a discussion of Weber, see Note 67.
"'Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 106 S. Ct. 3073, n.8.
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